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Following the fall-out, al-Qaeda has worked assiduously to reestablish itself as a major factor in the Levant to accomplish this, it has been forced to overcome several significant setbacks related to its organizational unity and coherence. So while the initial rift began deepening in Iraq in the mid-2000s, it developed into an internecine struggle during the early years of the Syrian civil war. When Zarqawi disregarded Zawahiri’s advice, he cemented AQI’s reputation as a ruthless organization where violence was almost an end in and of itself. When, in July 2005, Zawahiri penned a letter to the leader of AQI chastising him for his group’s wanton slaughter of Shiites, the former stressed the overall negative impact these actions were having on the al-Qaeda brand and urged him to eschew targeting other Muslims. One of al-Qaeda’s first steps to present itself as more evenhanded was denouncing blatant sectarianism and working to convince AQI to jettison sectarianism as a guiding principle. Even after pledging his loyalty to bin Laden and assuming the al-Qaeda moniker, Zarqawi still ignored directions from al-Qaeda’s core leadership and narrowly pursued his own sectarian agenda in hopes of igniting a Sunni–Shia civil war, first within Iraq, and then throughout the wider Islamic world. The group that would eventually become IS has always been something of a rogue element, formed and led by Zarqawi, who fought hard to preserve the independence of his affiliate. The truth is, as outlined in chapter 1’s discussion of al-Qaeda in Iraq, that the relationship was doomed from the start. The split itself occurred at the leadership levels of these groups, so one of the most interesting questions is: to what extent do foot soldiers and mid-level commanders really care, in actuality, about the previous infighting and strategic disputes? For some of the fighters at these levels, there is an obvious parallel to conflicts between street gangs, where members like the Bloods and Crips “fly their colors” – or represent their gangs by wearing their distinctive colors – and continuously disparage their adversaries by posting “dis videos” online, mocking and threatening rivals. The bitterness and divisiveness of the feud has played out on social media, with leaders on each side hurling vituperation and casting opprobrium on the other as “bad Muslims.” The initial castigation came from al-Qaeda’s leader Zawahiri himself, who fulminated against IS for being deviant from the al-Qaeda methodology. Whether and how these differences are ever resolved will have a major impact on the future of the movement writ large. The main differences are that IS sought to create a caliphate on a timeline considered premature by al-Qaeda, and IS pursued a far more sectarian agenda in attempting to achieve this objective.
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Both groups are attempting to recruit from the same milieus and influence similar constituencies. The Islamic State reverted to extreme levels of violence as one method of differentiating itself from its rivals, including al-Qaeda.
#AL QAEDA VS ISIS DRIVERS#
One of the primary drivers of such a heated competition is that, in many ways, the ideology and objectives of the group are so similar.
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The fall-out from the split between IS and al-Qaeda has led to a competition viewed by both sides as zero sum in nature, where progress by one of these groups signaled a loss for the other.